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The state of the art in stalking legislation.  
Reflections on European developments   
  
 










Although some European Member States have made important achievements with respect to 
anti-stalking legislation, significant deficiencies still exist. To begin with, the majority of 
Member States have not criminalized stalking at all, and the ones that have differ greatly as to 
certain constitutive elements of the crime of stalking. Stalking provisions vary, for instance, 
with respect to penalties imposed, the inclusion of a list of stalking tactics, requirements for 
prosecution, requisite intent on the part of the perpetrator, etcetera. Another aspect in which 
Member States diverge is the manner in which protection of (stalking) victims is constructed. 
This paper examines these issues in more detail and provides recommendations on how 
Member States should best design their anti-stalking and protection legislation. Looking at 
the US federal policy on stalking, it furthermore recommends on how the EU could stimulate 
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Stalking or ‘persistent harassment in which one person repeatedly imposes on another 
unwanted communications and/or contacts’
3
 is a pervasive problem. Prevalence estimates 
range from 4.5 to 23.4% of the population being affected
4
 and its impact on victims 
psychological, social and occupational functioning can be devastating.
5
 The criminalization of 
stalking is one of the fastest evolving legislative trends to spread across the world. What 
began in California in 1990 has inspired US states and several countries internationally to 
follow suit. However, where the American states were quickly convinced of the necessity to 
criminalize stalking – within less than four years all the 50 states and the district of Colombia 
had enacted anti-stalking legislation
6
 – the European Member States are more hesitant. In 
1997, Ireland and United Kingdom were the first in Europe to enact dedicated stalking 
legislation. Even to date, the majority of EU Member States have no specific anti-stalking 
legislation in place, and the ones that have differ greatly as to certain constitutive elements of 
the crime of stalking. 
 
While the public recognition of the phenomenon of stalking and anti-stalking legislation dates 
back to the 1980s in the US and has generated much (comparative) literature in the US, the 
European developments started at least a decade later and have until now spurred 
comparatively little attention. Still, it is important to have a good overview of the current 
state-of-affairs in stalking legislation in the European Member States. A thorough analysis of 
the ‘do’s and don’ts’ in anti-stalking legislation can benefit not only the Member States that 
are contemplating the enactment of such legislation, but also the Member States that have 
already installed certain provisions. The latter states will be given the opportunity to compare 
their national anti-stalking laws against the (European) yardstick: does their national law live 
up to the standard or should certain changes be made? 
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In the United States, the National Institute of Justice early on developed a model stalking code 
to encourage states to adopt proper anti-stalking legislation and to provide them with a 
template that was expected to withstand the anticipated constitutional challenges. As a result, 
many states amended their initial stalking statutes to bring them in line with the 
recommendations of the model code. Next to the model stalking code, the US also adopted a 
federal stalking law to tackle instances of inter-state stalking, it commissioned various studies 
to increase understanding and awareness of the problem, and it declared January National 
Stalking Awareness Month.
7
 In Europe, not having a federal legal system and with limited 
competence of the European Commission to harmonize legislation in the criminal legal 
domain, including stalking,
8
  there have not been similar supranational initiatives, at least not 
yet.  
 
Besides criminalization per se, stalking of women is also addressed within the context of a 
wider debate on the role of international law, and whether violence against women, as gender 
based violence, could be legally considered as a violation of human rights law.
9
 The debate is 
beyond the scope of this paper. It is relevant to mention here since some of the European 
developments address stalking in the context of a proposed new human rights instrument, 
emphasizing the so-called ‘three P’ approach, which not only focuses on prosecution 
(criminalization), but includes provisions of support and protective measures as well. On a 
wider European level, the recent (2011) Council of Europe Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence, reflects an international effort to 
introduce a binding regional human rights instruments, and  to  enhance national legislation in 
this field. This will be discussed this paper, together with some other national European 
developments in the field of stalking. Our focus is on developments within the EU primarily. 
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The question is: Should and could attempts be made to (further) harmonize the anti-stalking 
legislation in the EU Member States and if so, how?      
 
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to reflect on the current state of affairs in stalking 
legislation in the EU Member States (section 2): Which Member States have enacted anti-
stalking legislation and which Member States have not, how do legal definitions of stalking 
compare to each other, what similarities and differences can be discerned in the approach of 
Member States towards stalking, and what approach should be preferred if we take an 
integrated human rights based approach as starting point? Against that backdrop, not only the 
criminalization of stalking is taken into account, but attention is also paid to protective 
measures for victims, notably the possibility of obtaining civil and criminal restraining orders 
(section 3). For criminalization alone is not enough. Victims should also be able to apply for 
efficient protection from their assailant. The second aim is to see whether on a European level 
harmonization of national anti-stalking legislation might be feasible. To this end, the way in 
which the United States have tried to harmonize state legislation and the current initiatives on 
a European level are described first (section 4). After that, the most suitable legal basis for the 
EU to base its further involvement on is discussed (also section 4), followed by an overall 
conclusion (section 5).      
 
II. The criminalization of stalking in the European Member States 
 
This section takes stock of the ways in which European countries have criminalized the 
conduct. In 2007, there was a first attempt at mapping the different approaches towards 
stalking in Europe. In the context of the Daphne Research Program, the Modena Group on 
Stalking collected information and analyzed the legal situation in the European Member 
States.
10
 In a subsequent article, De Fazio updated the findings of the Modena Project.
11
 The 
most recent study that looked into stalking legislation in the European Member States was the 
European Commission’s feasibility study.
12
 Based on a detailed analysis of the (legislative) 
approach in the 27 EU Member States to inter alia violence against women, including 
stalking, a comparative analysis was made of how a range of legislative and support measures 
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had been taken in the EU. The following section partly builds on the results of these three 
previous studies, but is mainly based on an in-depth analysis of the legal provisions on 
stalking (see Appendix).     
 
In this section we will not discuss and compare all the constituent elements of the different 
legal stalking definitions that are used in the EU Member States. The definitions diverge 
widely. To analyze every one of them on a detailed level is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, we will focus on what seem to be the most essential and overarching similarities and 
differences between the various legal stalking definitions.   
 
1.  Legislation of Member States on stalking 
 
The 27 EU Member States are virtually split in half when it comes to whether or not stalking 
has been criminalized. A total of thirteen countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, and 
the UK) have criminalized, and a slight majority of fourteen European Member States have 
not criminalized stalking at all. These latter states often contest the necessity of having 
specific legislation in place. They argue that the existing laws are perfectly able to deal with 
instances of stalking already and that there is no need for a separate criminalization of the 
conduct. In their opinion, the combination between existing criminal law and (civil) 
protection order provisions should suffice to effectively counter stalking behaviour. Another 
reason why some Member States have not criminalized stalking is that the phenomenon is not 
considered a social problem.
13
 In those countries, the topic of stalking has not (yet) given rise 
to much public and academic debate, thereby failing to provide the necessary impetus for 
legislative change. The lack of any sustained public debate or activism regarding stalking was 
found to be one of the main reasons why some countries lack specific legislation on 
stalking.
14
 Some Member States that have not adopted specific criminal anti-stalking 
legislation encounter problems in bringing the problem under the attention of the police. In 
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 The generic criminal and civil law provisions are not efficient in combating stalking. 
The lack of a specific provision, for example, causes the police to wait for escalations 
and remain inactive in the early stages of the harassment, even if other provisions are 
applicable. 
 The generic provisions do not cover stalking in its entirety, they do not cover certain 
forms of stalking, and/or they do not cover certain victims of stalking. 
 
These problems have inspired the other Member States to criminalize stalking. Characteristic 
of the European situation is that there is a lot of variance in the way these Member States have 
defined the conduct and in the way prosecution is set up. However, before the legislative 
definitions are compared, a caveat needs to be made. The following analysis is based on a 
close reading of the anti-stalking provisions. It could be that in national practice, case law or 
parliamentary debates have introduced additional criteria. It was beyond the scope of this 
paper to structurally check for. Another problem could be that, despite due care, mistakes 
might have been made in translating and interpreting the legal provisions. Taking these 
limitations into account, if we look at the legal definitions of stalking (see Appendix), several 
commonalities can be discerned: 
 
1) With the exception of Belgium, all legal definitions require a ‘course of conduct’ or 
‘repetitive behaviour’, not single incidents. However, although according to Belgian law 
one incident can suffice, the Belgian Supreme court has ruled that the behaviour needs to 
be repetitive in order to qualify as stalking, making the difference in definition virtually 
theoretical.  
 
2) All the legal definitions use open or broad concepts, such as ‘harassment’ or ‘pursuit’, 
which require further interpretation by the courts. This broad terminology is used in an 
attempt to capture the variety of stalking tactics. More narrowly defined provisions 
exclude certain stalking behaviours and enable stalkers to easily circumvent prosecution. 
However necessary, notably to fully capture the wide range of stalking behaviours and the 
‘course of conduct’-element, it is exactly this broadness or all-inclusiveness which is 
sometimes criticized. In the Netherlands, for example, the broad definition of stalking and 
its possible infringement on the principle of legal certainty was heavily debated in 
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parliament before the new law was introduced.
16
 Broad concepts may evoke uncertainty of 
meaning and may – paradoxically – even lead to very strict interpretations in case law.
17
 
Some broad statutory elements such as ‘regular and persistent harassment’ or ‘with the 
intention to intimidate’, may not be inclusive enough, at least not in the minds of law 
enforcement officials. They may interpret these terms very strictly, only allowing the most 
serious cases to be prosecuted.  
 
Next to the similarities, there are also points on which the Member States diverge:  
 
a) A (new) provision in the Criminal Code or an Act  
 
The Member States that have criminalized stalking can be subdivided into three categories: 1) 
the Member States that introduced a new provision in their Criminal Code, 2) the Member 
States that amended an existing criminal provision, and 3) the Member States that introduced 
a dedicated Act against stalking. Usually, these legislative differences are inspired by long-
standing legal traditions. As appears from the Appendix, most Member States have opted for 
the inclusion of a new provision in their Criminal Codes. Only the UK and Ireland have 
created a specific Act which includes stalking behaviour. Denmark, which had already 
criminalized stalking-like behaviour back in 1933, has made several changes to the existing 
provision, mainly increasing the maximum penalty.  
 
The advantage of a dedicated Act over a new provision in the Criminal Code is that these Acts 
often bring along some form of framework regulation. This means that not only the 
criminalization of stalking is regulated, but also that other important aspects, such as the 
protection of the victim or the implementation of the law in practice, have been addressed in 
one and the same document. Of course, in other countries these other aspects may have been 
sufficiently regulated as well, albeit in a separate regulation.
18
 Both options bring different 
advantages and disadvantages, depending also on the wider national legislative context and 
culture.          
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b) The maximum and minimum penalty 
 
Where the range of sanctions is concerned, there is a lot of variance amongst the Member 
States. The statutory maximum penalty ranges from three months (Malta) to ten years 
imprisonment (Poland). In itself it is not surprising that the maximum penalties differ, since 
national legal systems tend to differ with regard to the maximum penalty for all sorts of 
crimes, regardless of the specifics of stalking. In order to establish a suitable maximum 
penalty for stalking, the entire national legal system has to be taken into account: What are the 
maximum penalties for other offences and where does stalking fit in? To recommend across 
the board that stalking should always carry a particular maximum penalty is therefore difficult 
and would have the undesirable consequence that in certain jurisdictions it would carry a 
higher penalty than offences that are generally considered equally or more worthy of 
punishment. However, what is relevant from a transnational EU perspective is that a rather 
low maximum penalty can cause problems when the extradition of a suspected or convicted 
stalker is requested.
19
 Usually, extradition schemes require what is called an ‘aggravated 
double criminality’.
20
 The offence not only has to be criminalized in the requested and the 
requesting country, but the maximum penalty in both countries needs to be at least one year 
imprisonment. Malta and Member States that currently consider drafting anti-stalking 
legislation are for that reason advised to create a provision that carries a maximum penalty of 
at least one year imprisonment. 
 
c) Negative consequences for the victim 
 
Member States’ legal definitions of stalking reflect different positions on whether evidence 
regarding the negative consequences of the stalking for the victim needs to be proven in court. 
In Germany, for instance, it needs to be proven that the behaviour has ‘seriously infringed on 
the lifestyle of the victim’. Similar requirements can be found in Ireland (‘seriously interferes 
with the other’s peace and privacy or causes alarm, distress or harm’) and Poland (‘raises in 
him a reasonable fear or significantly violates his privacy’). In Malta, the UK and Hungary, 
the situation is somewhat different. There stalking is comprised of two primary offences, both 
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2010, pp 191-213.  
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involving a course of conduct. In each of these countries, the first offence does not have 
negative consequences as a qualifying element for the crime of stalking. Only the second 
offence – carrying a higher maximum penalty – requires proof of the negative impact on the 
victim’s life. The Dutch, Czech, Italian, Belgian, Austrian, Luxemburg, and Danish anti-
stalking provisions do not require the victim to have experienced fear, distress or any other 
negative consequence as a result of the stalking. The advantage of this latter approach is that it 
alleviates the burden of proof for the (public) prosecutor: he or she does not have to collect 
evidence on the impact of the stalking on the victim. Especially where the mental effects are 
concerned, this requirement poses certain challenges. What is, for example, an appropriate 
level of fear and how can this be assessed adequately? And how can be prevented that an 
exceptionally equable victim is treated differently from a victim of a more nervous nature? An 
important factor in this respect is the fact that in the United States – the pioneer when it comes 
to the criminalization of stalking – more and more states are adopting anti-stalking legislation 
in which the victim is no longer supposed to actually have suffered a certain level of fear – 
e.g., fear of bodily injury or death – but where it suffices if a reasonable person would suffer 
emotional stress, because of the harassment.
21
  A number of US courts have held that this 
emotional distress no longer needs to be proven by independent expert testimony.
22
       
 
d)  A (limitative) list of stalking tactics 
 
A different approach can be seen in the Member States’ choice to either include or exclude a 
list of possible stalking tactics in the criminal definition. Some Member States have dismissed 
the idea of providing such a list as clarification of the open and multi-interpretable term 
‘stalking’ or ‘harassment’. They just used a national equivalent for the term ‘stalking’ and left 
it up to the courts to interpret what behaviour falls under the scope of the article. This 
approach is used in Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK. 
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husband, in: E. Mertz (ed.), The Role of Law in Social Science, Hampshire (USA): Ashgate 2008, pp. 355-391.  
o
22
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Other legislators thought it more expedient to provide the legal authorities with some 
guidance by spelling out certain behaviours that are typical of the crime of stalking. In those 
countries, the way in which the crime is clarified varies from a very basic description
23
 to a 
systematic enumeration of all the possible behaviours that could amount to stalking.
24
 In 
principle, providing something of a handle for the criminal justice actors to rely on it can be 
very useful to prevent or diminish problems with the lex certa principle – the principle that 
prescribes that the scope and definition of a criminal offence has to be sufficiently predictable 
for citizens so that they are informed about the potential consequences and can adjust their 
behaviour. However, legislators should be cautious not to include limitative or exhaustive lists 
of stalking tactics since stalkers are notorious for their creativity and they may be able to find 
ways to easily get round the criminal offence once a limitative list of acts is incorporated in 
the legal provision.
25
  This is particularly relevant in light of ongoing technological 
developments which facilitate new and sophisticated forms of stalking via internet and 




e) The term ‘stalking’ or a national term 
 
The Member States furthermore diverge in the use of specific (national) terms or a generic 
term (e.g., ‘harassment’) to designate the behaviour. With the exception of Poland, none of 
the thirteen Member States has used the term ‘stalking’, even though the public at large seems 
more familiar with that term.
27
 A possible disadvantage of using nationally specific linguistic 
expressions is that it may cause confusion, for example, when citizens do not realize that the 
national term actually covers stalking behaviour and, as a result, might refrain from going to 
the police. The use of a national or a more generic term could also hinder a joint and proper 
understanding of the concept of stalking among the various legal or helping professionals 
themselves.
28
 A stalking victimization survey at Victim Support the Netherlands, for instance, 
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 See, for example, the Hungarian definition of stalking.  
24
 See, for example, the Austrian definition of stalking.  
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 This was, for example, exactly the reason why the Dutch legislator decided not to include a list of stalking 
tactics (see the Parliamentary Documents Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 768, no. A, p. 4).  
26
   C. Southworth, J. Finn, S. Dawson, C. Fraser & S. Tucker, Intimate partner violence, technology and stalking, 
Violence Against Women (13) 2007, pp. 842-856. 
27
 De Fazio, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 2009, pp. 229-242.  
28
 Modena Group on Stalking (fn. 10), p. 57.   
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revealed that the volunteers had interpreted the Dutch equivalent of stalking (belaging) as a 




However, the indiscriminate adoption of the English word ‘stalking’ may generate 
disadvantages that are the exact opposite from the ones mentioned above. Stalking could, for 
instance, be seen as something that is more serious and less inclusive than harassment. Certain 
deviant behaviour may then fall under the radar of the general public or the police as well. 
Also it seems not the preferred choice of most countries to adopt foreign words or expressions 
in its national legislation. Regardless of the terms chosen, possible ambiguities as to its 
meaning can be addressed effectively by having the introduction of new anti-stalking 
legislation accompanied by a publicity campaign and a solid training of law practitioners.         
 
f) Prosecution on the basis of a complaint of the victim or prosecution ex officio  
 
Another difference between the Member States’ legislation is the manner in which the crime 
of stalking can be prosecuted. In some Member States the complaint of the victim is a 
statutory requirement for prosecution. This means that if there is no official complaint or if 
the complaint has been withdrawn within the statutory limits, the public prosecutor is barred 
from prosecution. Belgium, Luxemburg, Hungary, Poland and the Netherlands have adopted 
this approach. In Germany, stalking is also a complaint offence, but an exception has been 
made for cases in which the public prosecutor considers that there is a special public interest 
in prosecution. In the context of post-separation stalking, for example, the prosecutor can 
decide that the victim cannot be expected to ask for prosecution. In addition, if the stalker 
‘places the victim or a person close to the victim in danger of death or serious injury’, the 
offence has to be prosecuted ex officio as well. In Italy, there is also a combination of 
prosecution on the complaint of the victim and prosecution ex officio, and in Denmark they 
have a system which can be considered a derivative of the complaint procedure. Danish 
victims first have to request the police to issue a formal warning to the (alleged) offender and 
only after the offender has acted in violation of this warning, he or she can be prosecuted. The 
aforementioned procedures contrast with the systems in which prosecution is exclusively ex 
officio, as is the case in Austria and the UK.
30
 In Austria, up until January 2008, stalking 
                                                   
29
 See: Van der Aa (fn. 4), p. 109. 
30
 On the Czech Republic, Ireland and Malta no information could be found on whether or not stalking was a 
complaint offence. Possibly, in those Member States, this is not a requirement either.   
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perpetrated by means of (tele)communication and/or through third parties could only be 
prosecuted after a complaint of the victim. Nowadays, all forms of stalking can be prosecuted 
ex officio, even if this goes against the victim’s wishes.  
 
Each system has its pros and cons. The complaint requirement can form a barrier to 
prosecution. Some victims withdraw their complaints due to pressure from the suspect or out 
of fear of revenge, or the prosecution is hindered because of failure to comply with the 
formalities attached to the complaint procedure. In the Netherlands, for example, the public 
prosecutor was sometimes barred, because the case file did not contain an explicit complaint 
by the victim.
31
 On the other hand, there may also be victims who welcome to have decisive 
influence on prosecution that a complaint procedure brings along. They want to stop the 
stalking but have, for instance, a genuine fear or lack of faith in the effectiveness to follow the 
criminal legal procedure through.
 32
 Another reason why they do not wish to lodge a 
complaint is that they do not want to stigmatize the stalker or they dread having to reveal 
private matters in court. These victims resort to the police in search for other solutions instead 
of a trial, such as police protection or an official warning to the stalker.  
 
g) Intent of the stalker 
 
A final aspect in which the Member States’ legislation on stalking differs is the required level 
of intent or mens rea on the part of the perpetrator. Although the levels of intent vary per 
jurisdiction, the following degrees can roughly be distinguished: 
 
 Intentionally or purposely: the stalker has a clear foresight of the consequences of 
his/her actions, and desires those consequences to occur. 
 Knowingly: the stalker knows, or should know, that the results of his/her actions are 
reasonably certain to occur. 
 Recklessly: the stalker foresees that particular consequences may occur and proceeds 
with the given conduct, not caring whether those consequences actually occur or not.  
                                                   
31
 Van der Aa (fn. 4), p. 98. 
32
 S. van der Aa & A. Groenen, Identifying the needs of stalking victims and the responsiveness of the criminal 
justice system: A qualitative study in Belgium and the Netherlands, Victims and Offenders (6) 2011, pp. 19-37. 
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 Negligently: the stalker did not actually foresee that the particular consequences would 
flow from his/her actions, but a reasonable person, in the same circumstances, would 
have foreseen those consequences.  
 
Judging from the wording of the stalking provisions, it would appear that the Member States 
have indeed opted for different levels of intent, ranging from criminal negligence (UK, Malta, 
Ireland), via knowledge (Belgium, Luxemburg), to intent (Austria, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands).
33
 Depending on whether objectified, subjective or hybrid elements are allowed 
when establishing a certain level of mens rea, this could imply that in certain Member States 




Another distinction that can have an impact on the burden of proof is the one between basic 
intent and specific intent.
35
 A basic intent crime requires nothing more than that the crime is 
intentionally or recklessly committed. A specific intent crime requires (in addition to basic 
intent) that the offender intended certain negative consequences of his actions. Specific intent 
statutes may be more difficult to prosecute, given that the prosecution has to prove that the 
stalker intended the consequences of his actions.
36
Besides the additional burden to the public 
prosecutor, there is also the danger that it exempts a certain type of stalker from criminal 
prosecution. Erotomanics or love infatuated stalkers, for instance, generally claim they do not 
wish to harm the targets of their stalking behaviour, but wish to court them instead.  
 
III. The importance of protection 
 
                                                   
33
 In the stalking definitions of the Czech Republic, Denmark and Germany no element of intent could be 
detected. Probably, criminal intent in these countries is regulated elsewhere (e.g., in a general clause).  In Poland, 
only the stalking described in Article 190a (2) (‘pretending to be another person’) requires a certain level of intent 
on the part of the stalker.  
34
 With a subjective test of mens rea, the court must be satisfied that the accused actually had the requisite 
mental element present in his mind at the time of the crime. With an objective test, the requisite mens rea is 
inferred on the basis of the assumption that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have foreseen 
the consequences (P. Shears & G. Stephenson (eds.), James’ Introduction to English law. 13nd edition, London: 
Butterworths 1996, p. 158). A hybrid test (both subjective and objective elements) could also be admissible for 
some or all of the levels of intent. The burden of proof will generally be lower when an objective or a hybrid test 
suffices instead of a subjective test.  
35
 See D.S. Clark & T. Ansay (eds.) Introduction to the law of the United States. Second edition, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 2002, p. 143. 
36
 Tjaden, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 2009, pp. 261-278. 
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From a human rights based perspective the protection of victims of stalking is essential to 
fully realize their needs and to comply with emerging international human rights based 
standards.
37
This has been a guiding principle while drafting the Council of Europe 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence 
(2011) (we will address this in more detail below). When choosing a criminal legal trajectory 
it is equally important to recognize that victims of stalking show an additional need for 
protection against recidivism compared to victims of other, non-repetitive crimes. Research 
findings indicate that one of the victim’s primary concerns in seeking legal intervention is 
protection for themselves and their children.
38
 Due to the prevalent offender’s obsession with 
the victim, often directly related to  the fact that ex-partners who refuse to accept a separation 
are the most common category among stalkers, the chances of these victims being victimized 
for a second, third or even tenth time by the same offender are much higher than the chances 
for the average crime victim. As long as the stalking incidents keep recurring, victims remain 
under a constant threat, something which is not conducive to their recovery. One of the 
structural problems of stalking for victims is the ongoing fear that is installed since many 
victims are never sure whether and when the stalker might resume his/her behaviour. 
 
Merely making stalking liable to punishment is therefore both from a legal and psycho-social 
perspective not enough. Victims should also have access to (additional) protection as well as 
support services. Dedicated support services for victims of stalking are virtually absent in EU 
Member States.
39
 Although the protection of victims can be provided in various ways, e.g. via 
the use of electronic safety systems which allow victims to alarm the police at an earlier stage 
to enable arrest,
40
 this section focuses on legal measures, notably (temporary) civil and 
criminal protection orders. Next to the criminalization of stalking, this type of protection 
orders is often applied for to prevent repeat victimization. A caveat is in place though since 
the different protection order schemes in the EU Member States have never been the subject 
                                                   
37
 Cf. European Commission (fn. 8), pp. 125-127 and pp. 190-210 
38
 See H. Johnson, N. Ollus & S. Nevala, Violence against women: An international perspective, New York: 
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Studies Research Paper No 08/16, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084680 (last accessed 30 March 2012). Also: R. 
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 European Commission (fn. 8), pp. 69-70, and Annex 1, table 7 
40
 L. Balogh, J. van Haaf & R. Römkens, Tot hier en niet verder. Tilburg: IVA, 2008. Also: R. Römkens, 
Empowering technology. Protection of victims of intimate partner violence and stalking. Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of the American Society of Criminology. San Francisco: November, 2010.  
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of in-depth comparative study. As of late, certain research projects have touched upon the 
issue in a preliminary fashion and have scratched the surface of the various protection regimes 
in the EU.
41
 An additional problem is that sometimes the data contain irregularities and 
contradict one another.  
 
Despite these limitations, the available data at this point indicate that when it comes to 
criminal protection orders, practically each Member State has some form of protection in 
place,
42
 but the criminal protection orders come in many shapes and forms and the level of 
protection provided by them varies accordingly. In some Member States, the criminal justice 
system, for example, does not provide protection before there is a final judgment (e.g., 
Luxemburg, Bulgaria, Czech Republic). In these countries only the criminal courts can only 
impose protection orders in cases that resulted in a conviction. In other countries only pre-trial 
protection orders can be issued which are valid until the final judgment (e.g., Latvia, Italy). Of 
course, having both pre-trial and post-trial orders available is to be preferred.
43
 Another factor 
that can seriously hamper adequate victim protection is the restriction of criminal protection 
orders to a limited range of victims only. In Cyprus and possibly also Greece, for example, 
they are available to victims of domestic violence and/or human trafficking, but not to others. 
Victims who are stalked by people other than their (former) partners cannot benefit from the 
orders.               
 
For victims of stalking, one obstacle is probably even more problematic than all the 
aforementioned barriers to obtaining a criminal protection order and that is the fact that 
                                                   
41
 For example, the Modena Group on Stalking (fn. 10); European Commission (fn. 8), pp. 63-64; M.E.I. Brienen & 
E.H. Hoegen, Victims of crime in 22 European criminal justice systems (diss.). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 
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the questionnaire), Council Document No 5002/10 COPEN 1 of 6 January 2010).   
42
 Romania is the only Member State of which the studies indicate that criminal protection orders are possibly 
absent.  
43
 An alternative – and possibly equally effective – option is to have a separate, administrative or quasi-criminal 
procedure available for the administration of protection orders. This type of order can be found in the 
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the occurrence of a crime or even a link with a criminal procedure and the orders are issued by the police or the 
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criminal protection orders can only be imposed when suspicions of a crime have arisen. Since 
fourteen Member States have not criminalized stalking, victims who are stalked in those 
jurisdictions are practically left empty-handed. Unless the stalking consists of behaviour that 
is criminalized elsewhere in the Criminal Code, criminal protection orders are not available to 
them. 
 
Access to civil protection orders is more widely available: a large majority of EU Member 
States does provide access to civil injunction or civil restraining orders (except e.g., Romania, 
and Latvia). In comparison, American stalking victims seem better off: All US states allow 
individuals to seek civil protection when they are subjected to stalking by another person.
44
 
Another feature that puts stalking victims at a disadvantage is the fact that even in Member 
States where civil protection orders are available – again – not all stalking victims have access 
to them, for instance, because in some cases they are only available to victims of stalking by 
(ex-)partners. 
 
IV. European developments toward harmonization 
 
Notwithstanding the limitations, the information available does indicate that, when it comes to 
stalking legislation, there seems to be ample room for improvement. The following section 
focuses on European developments towards promoting and enhancing national anti-stalking 
legislation. We will first describe the US approach to see how US Congress has played an 
active role in trying to direct legislative efforts and reduce the differences between the 
different state based anti-stalking provisions. We will return to the European developments 
and briefly discuss whether and how a human rights based framework might be relevant to 
enhance developments towards harmonization. 
 
1.  Harmonization in the United States 
 
In the United States, stalking legislation is in principle regulated on a state level. Concerned 
that the states would enact flawed and unenforceable statutes and realizing the possible multi-
jurisdictional nature of stalking, the US Congress has however played an active role, and felt 
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the need to harmonize state laws and procedures within its territory.
45
 It did so with the help 
of different approaches.  
 
In 1993, after most states had already enacted anti-stalking legislation, the National Institute 
of Justice developed a model stalking Code to provide States with a template that was 
expected to withstand the anticipated constitutional challenges. This code was accompanied 
by a series of regional training seminars on issues related to the implementation of the model 
Code.
46
 As a result, many states amended their state statutes to bring them in line with the 
recommendations of the model Code. From this point of view, the model Code was a 
resounding success. Still there remain significant differences between the various state laws. 
States’ legislations differ, for example, with respect to the specific acts that are prohibited, in 




These differences would not matter as long as the stalking remains within the jurisdiction of 
one state only. But given that there are cases that cross borders, state law needed to be 
supplemented by federal law. For that reason, a federal interstate stalking law was enacted in 
1996 which prohibits individuals from travelling across a state line with the intent to injure or 
harass another person.
48
 Measures in the field of awareness raising and research received 
attention from US Congress as well. They commissioned several large-scale community 
studies on stalking
49
 and January was launched as National Stalking Awareness Month. 
 
All in all, when it comes to stalking, in the US on a federal level a great deal has been done to 
promote proper stalking legislation, increasing understanding through research, and raising 
awareness. The power to impose federal legislation, although under certain conditions, 
particularly the requirement that the behaviour takes place across State borders, is in this 
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respect crucial and the developments of national policy is to a certain extent inherent to the 
American federal system.  
 
2. Current initiatives in Europe 
 
As of lately, more and more initiatives have surfaced in order to place stalking firmly on the 
European agenda. On a transnational European level the political and legislative context is 
very different from the federal level in the US. Without addressing the differences in depth in 
this paper, it is important to point out that unlike the US, the European Union is not a federal 
system. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law the legislative competence of the European 
Commission is very limited. Member States are to a large extent autonomous when it comes 
to their national crime legislation and only under very strict conditions, approximation of 
binding criminal legislation on some cross-border criminal issues is possible.
50
  This imposes 
limitations on the EU competence in the domain of legislating stalking. Before looking at the 
options of the EU to stimulate the approximation of national legislation with respect to 
stalking, the initiatives that are currently being undertaken on the European level are 
discussed below.    
 
a) Council of Europe Convention 
The first initiative that deserves mentioning is the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, which was opened 
for signature on 11 May 2011. So far, nineteen countries have signed the Convention and 
Turkey was the first Member state of the CoE to ratify the Conventionin (December 2011).
51
 
After the Inter American Convention on the prevention, punishment and eradication of 
violence against women,
52
 the CoE Convention is the first European regional human rights 
instrument to specifically address violence against women as a form of gender based violence. 
The European Convention is much more detailed than the Inter American Convention in its 
call on States to address violence against women. From an international law perspective it is 
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innovative in its explicit recognition of violence against women as a human rights violation 
and as a form of discrimination. It calls upon States to develop a fully integrated response to 
prevent, protect and prosecute violence against women. It is the first international treaty to 
contain a definition of gender, recognising that the social roles assigned to women and men 
can contribute to the occurrence and acceptance of violence, notably against women.
53
 
Against that backdrop, the Convention specifically addresses stalking as well. Article 34 of 
the Convention calls upon States for criminalization of stalking and reads as follows: 
 
Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the 
intentional conduct of repeatedly engaging in threatening conduct directed at another 
person, causing her or him to fear for her or his safety, is criminalized.  
 
The explanatory report to the Convention explains that the ‘threatening behaviour may consist 
of repeatedly following another person, engaging in unwanted communication with another 
person or letting another person know that he or she is being observed’, but other types of 
behaviour are also mentioned (e.g., vandalizing the property of another person, targeting a 
person’s pet, setting up false identities or spreading untruthful information online).
54
 So 
although the Convention itself does not contain a list of stalking tactics, the explanatory report 
does. Although the explanatory report is not binding law, some issues deserve critical 
examination. Judging by the wording of the explanatory report, this list is not exhaustive, so it 
does not seriously limit the ambit of the provision. What potentially could, however, limit the 
interpretative scope of this article is the requirement that ‘any act of such threatening conduct 
needs to be carried out intentionally and with the intention of instilling in the victim a sense of 
fear’. In other words, the stalking provision is a ‘specific intent’ crime: In addition to 
intentionally committing prohibited acts, the stalker also intended the negative consequences 
of the actions. This not only places an extra evidentiary burden on the public prosecution 
service, but it could exempt the so-called love infatuated stalker from criminal prosecution. 
After all, this type of stalker usually claims that s/he does not intend the object of affection to 
experience fear, but only tries to persuade this person to enter into an intimate relationship 
with him or her. Yet, despite the absence of malignant intentions, these stalkers can still 
constitute a profound intrusion into the life of victims and can seriously violate the victim’s 
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privacy. This relates to another aspect problem with regard to the Convention’s call for 
criminalization of stalking: The explanatory memorandum could be interpreted as if the fear 
of the victim needs to be established in court. The problems that may arise out of such a 
requirement – What level of fear is required; what happens to an exceptionally equable victim; 
how can the level of fear be effectively measured and proven? – have already been touched 
upon in section 2.3. A final point is that Article 78 paragraph 3 allows signatory states to 
reserve the right to provide for non-criminal sanctions instead of criminal sanctions. The 
provision of civil or administrative protection orders could be such an option. Although this 
exception is understandable from a strategic point of view – states may be more willing to 
sign the Convention – it does not offer states a strong incentive to criminalize stalking.       
 
b) Developments in the European Union  
Despite the limited competence which constrains the development of transnational EU-
legislation on stalking, several political and legislative efforts reflect the growing concern for 
stalking victims within the EU. From a wider policy perspective the European Commission 
announced in the context of its 2010-2015 policy plans on gender equality, that it will adopt 
‘(a)n EU-wide strategy on combating violence against women (...) using all appropriate 
instruments, including criminal law, within the limits of the EU's powers, supported by a 
Europe-wide awareness-raising campaign on violence against women.’ 
55
 This echoes earlier 
plans to address the issue of violence against women in the context of a comprehensive 
programme to address inter alia rights of vulnerable groups in the EU (Stockholm 
programme).
56
These plans however have not materialized yet. On 5 April 2011, the European 
Parliament adopted a non-legislative resolution on priorities and outline of a new EU policy 
framework to fight violence against women (2010/2209(INI). According to the Members of 
Parliament ‘[s]talking should also be considered as a form of violence against women and be 
dealt with by means of a standard legal framework in all Member States’.
57
 However 
promising the text sounds, this effort is also a response to an earlier failed attempt to submit a 
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written declaration to the European Parliament, calling upon all 27 Member States to 
recognize stalking as a crime and take more appropriate measures to enforce the law, support 
victims, raise awareness and conduct research.
58
 Unfortunately, that written declaration lapsed 
due to insufficient support of the required number of MP’s signatures.
59
   It is a hopeful sign 
though that the European Parliament – after the lapse of the written declaration – has again 
taken up the issue of stalking. However, the statement itself is of a noncommittal nature. 
Member States can easily claim that they have a standard legal framework at their disposal for 
stalking cases, even though no specific arrangements have been made.    
 
So far, the only concrete legislative initiative dedicated to inter alia stalking is the EU 
Directive on a European protection order. The European protection order (EPO) ensures that 
nationally based criminal protection orders apply in other member States across the European 
Union. The executing state has to adopt a measure that would be available under its national 
law in a similar case and which corresponds, to the highest degree possible, to the protection 
measure ordered in the issuing state (Art. 9(1) and (2) EPO).
60
 Before this Directive, there 
was no legal basis in the European Union to enable a Member State to recognize a criminal 
protection order granted in another Member State. As a result, the victim who moved to 
another Member State would have to start new proceedings as if the previous decision had 
never been adopted. The problem is that the EPO has a very limited applicability – only 
stalking victims who move to another Member State and who remain to be in danger can 
benefit from the EPO – and it also does not change the fact that there are large discrepancies 




3. Towards harmonization across Europe 
 
As described in the previous paragraph, there have been various initiatives to induce states to 
adopt anti-stalking legislation or to otherwise improve the situation for stalking victims. These 
initiatives, although laudable, may not be sufficient for the following reasons: 
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 The EPO will only be applicable to a very limited number of cases without changing 
the current status quo in stalking or protection order legislation in the Member States. 
 The written declaration on stalking has lapsed and the ensuing resolution by the 
European Parliament does not really commit Member States to make significant 
changes to their legislation. 
 The Council of Europe Convention, which, by combining criminalization and 
protection in one binding instrument, is by far the most promising initiative but its 
becoming effective depends on the signing and ratification of the Convention by the 
states, so that can still take a while. The Convention furthermore departs from a 
concept of stalking which requires specific intent of the perpetrator and fear in the 
victim. This limits its scope and might exclude certain stalkers. Finally, paragraph 3 of 
article 78 allows the signatory states to make reservations to Article 34 and to opt for 
non-criminal sanctions instead.   
 
This leads to the question of which role the European Union can play in establishing a more 
far-reaching approximation of national laws. An incentive in the form of EU regulation could 
enhance the situation. Given the limited legal competence for harmonization of national 
legislation on the basis of binding legislation, it makes sense to look at possible alternatives 
for legal measures.   
 
In the Feasibility Study it was concluded that the open method of coordination (OMC) could 
offer a relevant alternative.
62
 This was first adopted in the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit 
in March 2000.
63
 The OMC is an intergovernmental method which consists of the drafting of 
common guidelines that are to be translated into national policy, combined with periodic 
monitoring and evaluation processes. It provides a framework for cooperation between the 
Member States in order to direct national policies toward common intergovernmental 
objectives. Peer reviews are organized and indicators and benchmarks are given as means of 
comparing best practices. The Commission may initiate an OMC in areas which fall within 
the competence of the Member States, such as stalking and protection order legislation. It is 
based on: 
                                                   
62
 European Commission (fn. 8), pp. 149-151. 
63
 Lisbon European Council, ‘Lisbon Extraordinary European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, Presidency 




 Jointly identifying and defining objectives to be achieved (adopted by the Council) 
 Jointly establishing measuring instruments (statistics, indicators, guidelines); and  
 Benchmarking, i.e. comparing the Member States’ performance and exchange of best 




Applying the open method of coordination in the field of stalking would not only send out a 
strong message to Member States that the criminalization of stalking and the protection of 
(stalking) victims is of paramount importance, but it would also provide the Member States 
with a template on which they can base their national legislation. In this sense it could 
resemble the US Draft Code, albeit that even better implementation mechanisms are provided 




The biggest omission in anti-stalking legislation in the EU is the fact that the majority of 
Member States have not criminalized the conduct. Specifically criminalizing stalking 
behaviour seems crucial, given that generic legal provisions are inefficient in combating 
stalking and do not cover stalking behaviour in its entirety. If those Member States would 
consider enacting anti-stalking legislation in the future, it is useful to learn from earlier 
experiences. The explorative comparison of stalking provisions presented here reveals, for 
instance, that using broad terminology is probably necessary, but that it may be in the interest 
of equal implementation in legal praxis to provide legal subjects with some guidance by 
means of including a (non exhaustive!) list of stalking tactics. Another factor to keep in mind 
is that a maximum penalty of less than one year may bring along extradition difficulties.   
 
Where sometimes the best option automatically surfaces, other choices are less 
straightforward. The choice between a national term and ‘stalking’ or between a new 
provision in the Criminal Code and a dedicated Act are good examples. Often it is a matter of 
legal tradition which option is chosen. Problems that may arise out of these choices can, 
however, easily be solved, for instance by having the introduction of new legislation 
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accompanied by a publicity campaign and police training or by regulating protection 
elsewhere. 
 
More difficult is the choice between including negative consequences for the victim (fear) as 
a constitutive element of the stalking provision or not, between prosecution ex officio and a 
complaint offence, and between the level of mens rea on the part of the stalker. Here 
fundamental differences of opinion on the reasons for criminalizing stalking, on the 
legitimacy of prosecution in these cases, and on the criminal liability of the offender play a 
role. Some laws stand out for the great importance given to the right to privacy, whereas other 
countries, with their emphasis on anxiety of the victim, take the right to live without fear as a 
justification for criminalization. Privacy also plays an important role in the choice between 
prosecution on the complaint of the victim and prosecution ex officio, but then in the sense 
that victims should (or should not) have the right to guard their private affairs from public 
interference. Member States will have to form an opinion on these issues and draft their 
legislation accordingly.          
 
The general picture that emerged from the comparison was that there is not only a huge 
variation in criminal anti-stalking legislation across the EU, but that victim protection in 
certain Member States leaves much to be desired as well. Both from a human rights and from 
a victim rights perspective, emphasizing the need to go beyond prosecution and offer 
preventive, supportive and protective provisions to victims, and in light of the growing body 
of international binding obligations to offer adequate victim protection,
65
 this situation no 
longer seems tenable. Not only the criminalization of stalking, but the combination of 
criminalization with protection is crucial. A first thing then, is to have all Member States 
implement civil and criminal, pre- and post-trial protection orders in addition to dedicated 
anti-stalking legislation.   
 
In the current political climate – heavily influenced by the economic crisis – chances are small 
that Member States would be at the forefront when it comes to spontaneously adopting new, 
possibly costly procedures to meet the needs of victims. An incentive on an EU level might 
help. Since the initiatives that are currently undertaken at the European level are limited for 
various reasons, and considering that there is no legal basis yet for drafting binding EU-
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legislation on this topic, a non-binding intergovernmental alternative – the Open Method of 
Coordination – has been proposed instead. Based on the US policy, where the drafting of a 
model code helped inspire many states to amend anti-stalking legislation, the idea is to draft 
common guidelines on the basis of the open method of coordination. This would not only 
send a strong message in favour of criminalization, but it would also provide the Member 
States with a template to base their national legislation on, and combine it with the fairly 



















2006 §107a of the Criminal Code: ‘(1) He who unlawfully 
insistently persecutes a person shall be punished with 
imprisonment of up to one year. (2) A person insistently 
persecutes if he, in a suitable way, with the intention of 
seriously affecting his way of life, during a longer period 
of time 1. seeks his physical proximity 2. uses 
telecommunication or other means of communication or 
third parties to get into contact with him 3. orders goods 
or services for him by using his personal data 4. prompts 
third parties to contact him by using his personal data.’ 
Belgium
1 
‘Belaging’ 1998 Article 442bis of the Criminal Code: ‘He, who harassed a 
person, while he knew or should have known that due to 
his behaviour he would seriously disturb this person’s 
peace, will be punished with a term of imprisonment of 
fifteen days to two years and with a fine ranging from 50 
euro to 300 euro or with one or those punishments. The 
behaviour described in this article can only be prosecuted 








2010 §354 of the Criminal Code: ‘He who pursues another for 
a long time by a) threatening him or a person close to him 
with harm to health or any other harm b) seeking his 
proximity or following him; c) persistently contacting 
him by electronic means, in a written form or otherwise; 
d) restricting him in his usual way of life; or by e) 
abusing his personal information in order to obtain 
personal or other contacts; and such conduct may invoke 
reasonable fear in the person pursued regarding his life or 
27 
 
health, or the life or health of persons close to him.’ 
Denmark
2 
‘Forfølgelse’ 1933 §265 of the Criminal Code: ‘Any person who violates the 
peace of some other person by intruding on him, pursuing 
him with letters or inconveniencing him in any other 
similar way, despite warnings by the police, shall be 
liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 2 years. A warning under this provision shall 
be valid for 5 years.’  
Germany
3 
‘Nachstellung’ 2007 §238 of the Criminal Code: ‘Whosoever unlawfully 
stalks another person by 
1) seeking his proximity 
2) trying to establish contact with him by means of 
telecommunications or other means of 
telecommunication or through third persons 
3) abusing his personal data for the purpose of ordering 
goods or services for him or causing third persons to 
make contact with him 
4) threatening him or a person close to him with loss of 
life or limb, damage to health, or deprivation of 
freedom, or 
5) committing similar acts 
and thereby seriously infringes his lifestyle shall be 
liable to imprisonment of not more than three years or 
a fine. 
(2)The penalty shall be three months to five years if 
the offender places the victim, a relative of or another 
person close to the victim in danger of death or 
serious injury 
(3)  If the offender causes the death of the victim, a 
relative of or another person close to the victim the 
penalty shall be imprisonment from one to ten years. 
(4) Cases under subsection (1) above may only be 
prosecuted upon request unless the prosecuting 
28 
 
authority considers propio motu that prosecution is 
required because of special public interest.’  
Hungary
1 
‘Zaklatás’ 2008 §176/A of the Criminal Code: ‘(1) Any person who with 
the intention to intimidate another person, or to disturb 
the privacy or the everyday life of another person, 
engages in the regular or persistent harassment of another 
person, by regularly seeking contact with a person against 
his/her will, either in person or by means of 
telecommunication, even if no serious crime has been 
committed, is guilty of an offence, punished by one year 
imprisonment, community work or a fine. (2) He who, 
for the purpose of intimidation, threatens to commit a 
punishable violent act against a person or a relative of 
this person, thereby putting that person in imminent fear 
of his/her life or health, or the life or health of a relative 
of this person is guilty of an offence, punished by two 
years imprisonment, community work or a fine. (3) He 
who harasses (a) a former spouse or registered partner, 
(b) a person under his care, custody, supervision or 
medical care, as mentioned in (1) shall be punished by 
two years’ imprisonment, community work or a fine, or, 
as guilty of the criminal offence mentioned in (2), with 
three years’ imprisonment.’ 
Ireland ‘Harassment’ 1997 Non-fatal Offences against the Person Act: Section 10: 
‘Any person who, without lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse, by any means including by use of the telephone, 
harasses another by persistently following, watching, 
pestering, besetting or communicating with him or her 
shall be guilty of an offence. For the purposes of this 
section a person harasses another where (a) he or she, by 
his or her acts intentionally or recklessly, seriously 
interferes with the other’s peace and privacy or causes 
alarm, distress or harm to the other and (b) his or her acts 
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are such that a reasonable person would realize that the 
acts would seriously interfere with the other’s peace and 
privacy or cause alarm, distress or harm to the other. A 
person guilty of an offence under this section shall be 
liable (a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
£ 1,500 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 
months or to both, or (b) on conviction on indictment to a 
fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years 





2009 Article 612bis of the Criminal Code: ‘If it is not a more 
serious crime, he who repeatedly harasses or threats 
another person in order to cause a persistent anxiety or 
fear or a serious concern for his/her safety or for the 
safety of another person linked to the victim by an 
affective bond, or to oblige such person to change his/her 
own life habits, is punished with imprisonment of six 
months to four years. The punishment is increased if the 
offender is an ex-partner of the victim. The punishment is 
increased with up to a half if the victim is a minor, a 
pregnant woman, or a person with disabilities as 
described in article 3 law n. 104 of 1992, or if the act is 
committed with weapons or by a distorted person. The 
crime is punishable on the complaint of the victim. The 
authority proceeds ex officio if the act is committed 
against a minor or a person with disabilities (…) as well 
as when the act is connected with another crime for 





2009 Article 442-2 of the Criminal Code: ‘Anyone who 
repeatedly harassed a person while he knew or should 
have known that by such conduct he would seriously 
affect the tranquillity of that person, shall be punished 
with imprisonment of fifteen days to two years and a fine 
of 251 to 3000 euro, or one of these penalties. The 
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offence in this article shall be prosecuted on the 




‘Fastidju’ 2005 Article 251A of the Criminal Code: ‘A person who 
pursues a course of conduct which amounts to 
harassment of another person, and which he knows or 
ought to know amounts to harassment of such other 
person, shall be guilty of an offence under this article. 
For the purpose of this article, the person whose course of 
conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to 
harassment of another person if a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information would think the 
course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other 
person. A person guilty of an offence under this article 
shall be liable to the punishment of imprisonment for a 
term of one to three months or to a fine of not less than 
two thousand and three hundred and twenty-nine euro 
and thirty-seven cents and not more than four thousand 
and six hundred and fifty-eight euro and seventy-five 
cents, or to both such fine and imprisonment. Provided 
that the punishment shall be increased by one degree 
where the offence is committed against any person 
mentioned in article 222 (1).’ Article 251B of the 
Criminal Code: ‘A person whose course of conduct 
causes another to fear that violence will be used against 
him or his property or against the person or property of 
any of his ascendants, descendents, brothers or sisters or 
any person mentioned in this article 221(1) shall be guilty 
of an offence if he knows or ought to know that this 
course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each 
of those occasions, and shall be liable to the punishment 
of imprisonment for a term from three to six months or to 
a fine of not less than four thousand and six hundred and 
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fifty-eight euro and seventy-five cents and not more than 
eleven thousand and six hundred and forty-six euro and 
eighty-seven cents, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment.’ Article 251C of the Criminal Code: ‘in 
articles 251A and 251B references to harassing a person 





‘Belaging’ 2000 Article 285b of the Criminal Code: ‘He who unlawfully, 
systematically, intentionally intrudes upon another 
person’s privacy with the aim of forcing that person to do 
something, to refrain from doing something, to tolerate 
something or to instil fear in that person, is liable, as 
guilty of stalking, to a prison term with a maximum of 
three years or a fine of the fourth category. Prosecution 
can only occur on the complaint of the person against 
whom the crime was committed. 
Poland ‘Stalking’ 2011 Article 190a of the Criminal Code: ‘(1) He who by the 
persistent harassment of another person or a person’s 
near ones raises in him a reasonable fear or significantly 
violates his privacy shall be liable to an imprisonment of 
up to 3 years. (2) He who, pretending to be another 
person, uses his image or other personal data in order to 
cause material or personal damage, shall be subjected to 
the same penalty. (3) If the act specified in § 1 or 2 
results in a suicide attempt by the victim, the perpetrator 
is liable to an imprisonment of one to 10 years. (4) 
Prosecution of the crime specified in § 1 or 2 occurs at 





people in fear 
of violence’ 
1997 Protection from Harassment Act: Section 1: 'A person 
must not pursue a course of conduct (a) which amounts to 
harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought 
to know amounts to harassment of the other. For the 
purposes of this section, the person whose course of 
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conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to 
harassment of another if a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information would think the 
course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.' 
Section 2: 'A person who pursues a course of conduct in 
breach of section 1 is guilty of an offence. A person 
guilty of an offence under this section is liable on 
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on 
the standard scale, or both.' Section 4: 'A person whose 
course of conduct causes another to fear, on at least two 
occasions, that violence will be used against him is guilty 
of an offence if he knows or ought to know that this 
course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each 
of those occasions. For the purposes of this section, the 
person whose course of conduct is in question ought to 
know that it will cause another to fear that violence will 
be used against him on any occasion if a reasonable 
person in possession of the same information would think 
the course of conduct would cause the other so to fear on 
that occasion. A person guilty of an offence under this 
section is liable on conviction on indictment, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a 
fine, or both, or on summary conviction, to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not 
exceeding the statutory maximum, or both.' Section 7: 
‘References to harassing a person include alarming the 
person of causing the person distress.’ 
1 
This legal definition was translated by the author (with the help of a native speaker). 
2 
This translation was copied from De Fazio, European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 2009, pp. 229-242. 
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